The rise of data centers is pushing states to secure abundant and stable electricity. In the United States, the executive is banking on fleets of AP1000, targeted loans and financing frameworks, while Beijing is increasing its projects and keeping up. Arbitrations over who pays and the rapid evolution of opinion on nuclear power determine what happens next.
Who pays what: private commitments, FERC rule and blocked law
The cost of new electricity needed for data centers is at the heart of the equation. In March 2026, seven technology giants including Amazon, Google, Meta and Microsoft signed a consumer protection commitment, extended in July to public services, developers and states. The White House now lists more than 280 signatories and 23 states. Signatory companies undertake to establish or acquire a specific energy source, to cover all costs related to transmission infrastructure, to pay the planned tariffs whether or not they use the energy, and to work with network operators on the issue of resilience. According to the executive, this commitment concerns about 80% of the energy supplied to households and businesses, but it remains voluntary and non-binding at the federal level, a scope that some analysts consider essentially symbolic. On June 18, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission required the six regional grid operators under its jurisdiction to review or justify the arrangements for connecting large loads such as data centers, with studies limited to a period of 60 to 90 days, as well as obligations regarding cost transfer and co-location with generation. At the same time, the Consumer Protection Law passed the House by 417 votes to 3 before failing in the Senate on the voluntary or obligatory nature of the obligations. Consensus remains on the principle that data centers must cover their costs, with the mechanism still to be decided. EPRI notes that between 2015 and 2024 data center growth modestly reduced average residential rates nationally by better distributing fixed costs, while in the PJM it accounted for about half of recent increases in capacity prices. Properly designed, new nuclear and generation capacities can shift investment to industrial users rather than households.
American industrial cap: AP1000, loans and Korean framework
The two AP1000s commissioned at Vogtle constitute the technical and regulatory benchmark in the United States: they are the only large advanced commercial reactors to have been entirely designed and authorized for operation in the country. In May 2025, Executive Order 14302 established the goal of launching the construction of 10 large reactors whose design is finalized before 2030. In October 2025, the Department of Commerce formed a partnership with the owners of Westinghouse, Cameco and Brookfield around at least $80 billion of AP1000, with the State responsible for aggregating financing and support for permitted and planning to receive 20% of Westinghouse’s cash distributions in excess of $17.5 billion once construction commitments are made. On June 23, 2026, the Department of Energy conditionally approved up to $17.5 billion in loans to acquire long-lead equipment — such as heavy forgings, pressure vessels, turbines and generators — for 10 AP1000 units across up to five sites, each comprising two reactors. For each project, ownership will need to be split between Westinghouse and a power provider, with each party investing $500 million in equity, and Westinghouse has entered into letters of intent with seven potential partners that already have sites. The advance purchase of critical components is expected to take up to three years off the construction schedule. Two additional milestones were reached in October: a framework with South Korea to erect six AP1000s and two APR1400s in the United States, valued at $120 billion with a deposit of $10 billion due before the end of the year, and the inclusion of these eight units in the national goal of 10 reactors. Locations are not yet made public, with Cameco indicating deployment on federal lands starting with two AP1000s. Additionally, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission extended the design certification of the AP1000 until 2066, incorporating approximately 200 amendments based on Vogtle’s experience. The current reference reflects the way in which Vogtle 3 and 4 were built and operated, allowing future project leaders to rely on it without requiring further approval of these already assessed developments. Ho Nieh, chairman of the NRC, describes the ambition as a move from isolated units to large-scale deployment. This certification does not, however, entail any site authorization, each project remaining subject to its own permits.
The papers and advances that matter, explained simply, every evening. Free.
Included upon registration: our selection of the best AI guides & comparisons.
Choose your pace
Free · No spam · Unsubscribe in 1 click
Speed and volumes: China is increasing its construction sites
The Chinese trajectory is distinguished by its pace and scale. Between 2016 and 2024, installed nuclear power in the country increased by 76%, which represents approximately 24 additional gigawatts in eight years. As of May 2026, China operates 60 reactors worth nearly 59 gigawatts and has another 36 under construction, corresponding to about half of the world’s current nuclear projects. According to the International Energy Agency, nine of the ten nuclear project starts planned for 2025 are in China. This progression is based on standardized batches and predominantly national components, with an average construction time estimated by the EIA at around six years between 2012 and 2021, compared to around nine years globally. In contrast, it is noted that in the United States, the last two reactors took approximately fifteen years. On July 31, 2026, the State Council approved eight additional reactors in four projects located in Zhejiang, Guangdong, Liaoning and Shandong, with an estimated cost exceeding 160 billion yuan (about $24 billion). Six are on the Hualong One design and two are on the Guohe One. This dynamic is part of a target of around 110 gigawatts installed by 2030, and a projection of 150 gigawatts by 2035 by the China Nuclear Energy Association. China is on track to overtake the United States and the European Union in installed capacity as early as 2030, according to some estimates. The comparison remains unfavorable for the United States in terms of speed: China validated eight reactors in a single meeting when Washington has not yet announced sites or work launches for its new program.
American starting point: a large but aging fleet
The United States remains the leading nuclear nation in terms of the size of its fleet, with 94 reactors in service for approximately 97 gigawatts. This fleet was mainly built between the 1960s and the end of the 1980s, before construction almost came to a halt. Watts Bar Unit 1, commissioned in 1973 and commissioned in 1996, completed this period. Since then, only three reactors have joined the network: unit 2 of Watts Bar in 2016 and units 3 and 4 of Vogtle in 2023 and 2024. Vogtle illustrates the pitfalls encountered: around 35 billion dollars in total cost, for an initial budget of around 14 billion, and almost seven years of delay in delivery.
AI demand pushes towards controllable, low-carbon production
The rise of AI is inseparable from a massive increase in electricity needs. An academic estimate puts the capacity of American data centers expected at 188 gigawatts by 2032, a load which, at full capacity, would be equivalent to the annual consumption of current American homes. In this context, nuclear power has several sought-after characteristics: it does not generate carbon emissions, operates continuously without depending on weather conditions and its density makes it possible to install capacities close to loads of the order of gigawatts without requiring an overhaul of the regional network. Small modular reactors offer an alternative when the standard 1.1 gigawatt size is not suitable; an agreement signed in January 2026 between Meta and TerraPower could allow the commissioning of up to eight reactors of this type.
Opinion and incentives: from taboo to tax credit
The restart of programs cannot be explained without a recent change in perceptions about nuclear power. For a long time, the atom was kept away from the notion of clean energy, associated in the collective imagination with Three Mile Island, Chernobyl or Fukushima rather than zero emissions, and fought by part of the environmental movement in favor of solar and wind power. In recent years, climate activists and scientists have reassessed its place in decarbonization. In terms of economic signals, the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 established a production tax credit for existing facilities, strengthening the viability of assets already in service.

